Spotlight on… Colombia’s Peace Process
Background
The Colombian government and the guerrilla group FARC are trying to end more than five decades of armed conflict. The two sides began formal peace talks in November 2012 until a peace deal was formally signed last September between President Santos and Rodrigo Londono, also known as Timochenko. Under the agreement, the rebel group would have to hand over their weapons to the United Nations in return for agricultural reforms, seats in Congress and reduced punishment for crimes. However, on October 2nd, after a strong ‘No’ campaign led by former President Uribe, Colombians voted against the peace deal in a national referendum by a narrow margin of 0.4%. After four years of negotiations, the deal cannot now be implemented which creates uncertainties regarding the future of the country. As the UK’s Brexit vote, neither the Colombian government nor the opposition has a Plan B.
Restoration of violence, economic deterioration and crisis of governability
The risks for destabilisation are high. Despite a strong commitment by Timochenko and Santos to achieve peace, questions arise regarding the agreed ceasefire and for how long it will last. The two main points that need to be renegotiated are FARC’s political participation and the transitional justice system laid out in the agreement, which are widely contested by Uribe and its supporters. Since the No campaign won, a further renegotiation of terms is more likely to have a less beneficial outcome for FARC. In turn, this might give to mid-rank commanders in the group an incentive to take up arms again or to join other armed groups such as the ELN or drug cartels. There is a clear risk that the former will use this opportunity to grow and fill FARC’s power vacuum by establishing its own military-political opposition. In addition, the protraction of negotiations with FARC won’t allow security forces to focus on their fight against organised crime groups and on protecting the population from their threat.
The outcome of the referendum also had a strong impact on investors’ confidence with the Colombian Peso depreciating and a decline in the country’s bonds in its immediate aftermath. The IMF has already adjusted Colombia’s overall GDP growth projections to 2.2% for 2016 (down from 2.5% in January) and 2.7% for 2017 (down from 3.0% in January).
However, one of the main issues also concerns the uncertainty regarding the legitimacy that the government will retain to deliver reforms in the face of Colombia’s political polarisation. The ‘No’ vote will have an impact in limiting his administration’s legislative power, as controversial policy decisions could diminish public support for any future peace negotiations. Firstly, this will translate into a weakening of the tax reform that is scheduled for the end of the year and needed in order to plug a hole in public finances following the fall in oil prices. In addition, progress in tackling challenges facing investors (eg. deficient infrastructure, high-level corruption, regulatory uncertainty) is also likely to remain slow for the next couple of years.
Overall, it seems like a negotiated agreement is possible and will emerge in time due to the determination of both sides to achieve peace. However, in the short-term, the referendum outcome will have a decisive impact on Colombia’s stability.
About Fosca D'Incau
I am a postgraduate student in the MSc in Conflict Studies degree with a focus on the impact of the media on political processes. I did my undergraduate degree in International Relations with a specialisation in the Middle East at King’s College London. I am also currently the Publications Director of PRIS. I am particularly interested in political risk assessments regarding Latin America and MENA. I speak Italian, French, English, Spanish and I am learning Arabic.
