Spotlight on... the French Presidential Election
Hamon’s victory and the ‘Penelopegate’
Unforeseen electoral events continue in 2017. Newcomer Benoit Hamon has won the Socialist Party primaries against former Prime Minister Manuel Valls and left-wing Arnaud Montebourg. However, while Hamon is very unlikely to win the presidential election (Ipsos, Kantar-Sofres and other polls currently put him at 10-15%), another unexpected event has impacted the race: the “Penelopegate” scandal. François Fillon, the conservative candidate widely expected to become France’s next president, has built a reputation of sternness and honesty, and previously stated that his wife, Penelope, was detached from politics. It emerged, however that the latter had been a parliamentary assistant to her husband for an unusually high salary. More unusual still, nobody has ever seen her working alongside her husband and former boss.
The race between Fillon, Le Pen and Macron
At this point, three candidates could win the election: Fillon, Marine Le Pen, and Emmanuel Macron. The former is promising radical reforms to deregulate France’s economy: lowering the costs of hiring, cut taxes on businesses by 40 billion euros as well as public spending by another 100 billion euros; firing 500,000 civil servants, raising VAT by 2 percentage points, and bringing flexibility to France’s labour market by, for instance, scrapping the 35 hours working week. He plans to decrease health and local spending, as well as unemployment benefits, while increasing spending in security. His program also includes scraping sanctions on Russia and expanding the lifetime of France’s ageing nuclear power plants. While these policies could result in a positive competitive shock for France and increase investment, it is uncertain whether he would manage to push them through the streets.
Marine Le Pen’s program is now well known. She wants France to exit the Eurozone, the EU altogether and NATO. She is also in favour of canceling sanctions on Russia and making greater use of nuclear energy. She envisions a reindustrialisation of France by imposing import tariffs, and taking control of France’s borders. Aside from the likely deleterious impact of these policies on the country’s economy and security, the European Union is unlikely to survive a 'Frexit', casting doubt on the continent’s economic and financial stability. Yet Le Pen is very unlikely to win the run-off, let alone the 'Frexit' referendum she is proposing.
Finally, Macron is markedly pro-European, in favour of a “sovereign Europe” and of some degree of free market liberalisation of France’s economy. He hints at decreasing the use of diesel cars and nuclear energy, and prioritises massive investments in disadvantaged suburban areas as well as health and education spending. However, he intends to keep France’s Eurozone budgetary commitments, for Paris to regain credibility and relaunch the French-German European political engine. Macron is seen as the third man in a race of two: he is predicted not to make it to the run-off, although by a very thin margin. Indeed, a Sofres poll put Fillon at 21% (behind Le Pen’s 25%), but Macron is very close, at 20%.
Who will win?
Valls’ defeat and Fillon’s free fall in popularity due to the ‘Penelopegate’ (minus 15% of favourable opinion in less than a week) are likely to considerably benefit Macron. According to Sofres’ Emmanuel Rivière, "What boosts Emmanuel Macron's momentum is above all Penelopegate”. In addition, disillusioned Valls supporters are already falling back on Macron’s candidacy due to their overlapping views on numerous topics. A Le Pen – Macron second round scenario is now increasingly likely, and the possibility of a Macron presidency is becoming plausible. However, while he is popular among businesses, his full program is due to be unveiled by early March, and external factors – such as another terrorist attack – could highlight his relative inexperience.
About the author
French and Bulgarian, Marc Nikolov has studied International Relations at King’s College London. He has a special interest in the EU and in Russian foreign policy; and is currently regional editor for The New Federalist. He is also a member of JEF, the Young European Movement.
