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Spotlight on… the Italian Constitutional Referendum


Background

In April, the Italian Chamber of Deputies approved the constitutional reform bill that modifies, among other things, the configuration and role of the upper chamber, the Senate. On the 4th of December, Italians are called to vote in a referendum to ratify the approval of this reform and the international community is anxiously awaiting the results. Just a few days from the vote, panic is spreading across nationals and internationals who fear that Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s resignation would throw Italy in populists’ hands, in line with what seems to be an endemic spread of populism in western democracies.

The reform

As things stand, the Italian parliament is a rare example of perfect bicameralism in which there are two equally powerful chambers (Chamber of Deputies and Senate) directly elected by the people. Each law needs to be approved in the same text by each chamber, which is seen by many as dysfunctional and inefficient. This reform aims to overcome such bicameralism via a thorough reformation of the Senate that provides for the number of senators to be reduced by two thirds and senators to no longer be directly elected by the people. The majority will be elected by and within regional councils, autonomous provinces and some among mayors. The President of the Republic will appoint the remaining five senators for a duration of seven years. As for its functions, the Senate will no longer be able to grant the vote of confidence to executives and will only have a say on some specific issues such as the EU, regions and municipalities, referendums and linguistic minorities.


This reform needs be analysed in conjunction with the already reformed electoral law, the Italicum. It provides for majority bonuses granted to the party that gets the relative majority of the votes. Hence, a party with only the 30% of the votes would get the majority of seats in parliament, creating a rather skewed representation of the political preferences of the country.

The ‘yes’ scenario

If yes won, many argue that Italy would overcome the chronic instability and stagnation of a system in which both chambers have to approve bills in the same text and in which governance is guaranteed by often unstable coalitions and precarious alliances. Many supporters of the reform think that, once carried out these institutional changes, Italy would finally have a stable system capable of tackling the huge debt and the economic and political stagnation. Whether the solution to Italy political and economic crisis lies in this constitutional reform is up for debate.


If yes won, at the next 2018 general elections the Chamber of Deputies would be elected with the Italicum and would have the exclusive power of granting confidence to the executive. It could arise a scenario in which the party with only 30% of the votes gets the majority in the chamber of deputies and forms a government that for the duration of the legislatures as a de-facto absolute power. As things stand now, the second party, after Renzi’s Democratic Party, is the Five Star Movement (M5S). Populist and anti-European, after two more years of Renzi’s rule, in 2018 the M5S will have more than a chance to gain the votes necessary for gaining the absolute majority of seats in the lower chamber and form a government not accountable to anyone else but the chamber of deputies in which it enjoys an absolute majority.

The ‘no’ scenario

The worrying scenario in case of a no victory has nothing to do with the victory of no in itself. Rather it is more about the consequences of Renzi’s announcement that he would resign in case the referendum had a negative outcome. This unfairly bestowed upon the referendum a different meaning altogether, turning the decision on the reform into a nationally held vote of confidence to Renzi’s executive. If Renzi resigned in case of a no victory, new general elections could be called and the M5S, surfing the wave of anti-establishment feelings, could easily gain the votes needed according to the Italicum to form a M5S government. In this case, though, the M5S would still be accountable to both chambers and its conduct subject to checks and balances. Obviously, the prospect of a M5S victory is what worries international observers the most for its seen, in the aftermath of Brexit and Trump’s victory, as the ultimate threat to the EU and market stability.


However, Renzi could simply not resign. In the last few months he has hinted many times at this possibility. Moreover, even if he resigned, elections would not necessarily be called. Instead, a caretaker government may be appointed and the status quo would just be reconfirmed until the next elections in 2018.

What the future looks like?

Undoubtedly, in the short term, a no victory is more likely to shake markets and affect the already shivering small Italian banks. However, this financial vacillation should prove to be more amendable than the structural-institutional changes the reform would bring about. In the era of rising populisms, carrying out a constitutional reform that centralises power and reduces checks and balances on the executive is a risky business. If this reform was approved, at the next elections anti-EU M5S would have more than a chance to gain an absolute majority and form a government accountable only to, essentially, its own party. Not only this would result in a major risk for the EU, as the M5S would have the power to question Italy’s membership, but also for the country as a democracy. Granting one party a de-facto absolute power for five years is certainly not a change towards a more functional democracy, rather it is a step away from it taken in name of stability and sold in name of progress.

About Virginia Chiara Grieco


Virginia Chiara Grieco is a post-graduate student in the MA in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at City University of London. As an International Politics undergraduate at King’s College London, I dedicated my dissertation project to analysing the causes of institutional change in Italy by applying notions of critical juncture theory. Mainly interested in European countries, I passionately follow developments in Italian domestic politics.


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